TASK FORCE BAUM: PATTON'S FAILURE IN LEADERSHIP

General George Patton was no stranger to controversy. Perhaps the best battlefield commander the US Army had during World War ll, Patton always seemed to hold opinions he needed to share with others that few of them appreciated, especially his commanders. While the two incidents of him slapping soldiers in Army field hospitals in Sicily are well known, his ill-conceived raid on a POW camp in Himmelberg Germany in March 1945 is not well known and should have gotten Patton fired on the spot by General Eisenhower, the supreme allied commander in Europe. The raid cost the lives of at least 30 soldiers and was a total failure.

To understand Task Force Baum, one must return to North Africa in 1943 where Lieutenant Colonel John Waters was captured by the Germans and in 1945 was being held in the Himmelberg camp.  Patton wanted Walters rescued because Waters was Patton’s son-in-law and this rescue raid had to be planned in almost total secrecy so that Patton’s battlefield superior, General Omar Bradley, or Eisenhower would not learn of the plan and veto it.

To get the soldiers and equipment needed for the raid, Patton turned to one of his best tank officers, Lieutenant Colonel Creighton Abrams for assistance. Abrams was commander of Combat Command B of the 4^th Armored Division with two tank battalions and supporting artillery at his disposal. Abrams’s request to use one entire battalion in the raid was overruled by Patton, so Abrams had to settle on a kluge of units and vehicles. To command the task force Abrams wanted to use one of his battalion commanders but he was ill. In turn, the sick officer recommended his S-3 (operations) officer, Captain Abraham Baum. Thus, Task Force Baum was formed with the following order of battle- 11 officers, 303 enlisted men, 16 tanks, 28 half-tracks, and 13 other vehicles. In addition, Baum had a superior officer from Patton’s staff assigned to the task force as an observer; in reality, the officer’s mission was to identify Waters and “manage” him throughout the rescue.

On the evening of March 26, the task force began its planned 50-mile march to Himmelberg from south of the German-held city of Aschaffenburg just inside the German state of Bavaria. The Americans ran into immediate trouble due to a lack of intelligence- inadequate maps and the intensity of German resistance. Several tanks were lost, and a German reconnaissance aircraft flew above the task force during daylight the following day, March 27 to alert the regular German army and the paramilitary civilian defense forces to Baum’s location.

Their poor intelligence became readily apparent when Task Force Baum reached Himmelberg POW camp late in the day. Reduced to barely half of his original vehicles, Baum only had enough of them to carry back 300 US soldiers. Unbeknownst to the allies, the number of POWs in the camp was in the thousands due to relocation of allied POWs from the east and from the Battle of the Bulge several months earlier. Upon arrival, task force soldiers were fired upon by German guards and in the ensuing skirmish, several allied POWs were injured by gunfire because their gray uniforms resembled the Germans. Fearing he could be blamed for further injuries the German camp commander asked Waters to negotiate a ceasefire with the task force. Upon exiting his assigned barracks Waters was shot and severely injured. Nevertheless, a truce was arranged.

Baum then found himself in an almost impossible situation. Camp conditions had become dire to the preceding harsh European winter. Each POW only had enough food for 1100-1700 calories daily (a minimum of 2000 calories daily was necessary) and many had lost 50-60 pounds. Heating the many barracks was nearly impossible, with only 20 degrees heat throughout the cold winter and spring days. Therefore, too many POWs were too ill to be moved. And that now included Waters.

Baum’s decision was that only field grade (majors and above) US officers could be transported back to the Aschaffenburg area. Any other POWs could follow the task force vehicles on foot if they so desired. Task Force Baum begin its return journey during the evening hours of March 27. The US force encountered stiff German attacks more destruction of vehicles, and almost complete encirclement.

Finally, Baum ordered his troops to abandon the convoy, and everyone was for himself. About 6-32 soldiers returned to the US lines (reports vary). 32 were killed, and all the others were either missing or captured- many of the captured had also been wounded or injured.  Baum himself was shot in the groin while attempting to escape and was placed in the same POW camp hospital as Waters. His last act before being captured was to hide his dog tags because they identified his religion- Jewish.

The responsibility for the failure of Task Force Baum lies totally with General Patton. His poor leadership and disregard for the lives and welfare of men under his command during this incident should have led Patton to be relieved of his command of the Third Army. Consider the following factors:

1.     Eisenhower and Patton were old friends. Patton romanticized war and if anyone should have realized this raid was part of Patton’s attempt for further glory, that person would be Eisenhower.

2.     Both Eisenhower and Patton had served under General Douglas MacArthur at various times in their careers. Jealousies and rivalries ensued, especially on Patton’s part. In January 1945 MacArthur as theater commander in the Philippines had authorized a POW rescue mission that saved 500 Americans from probable execution by the Japanese. Army Rangers and Filipino Scouts carried out their assignment with good maps, intelligence, and coordination. Patton was jealous of MacArthur’s achievement and wanted to order something similar. But Patton was not the theater commander in Europe, Eisenhower was.

3.     Task Force Baum did not have good maps, intelligence, or coordination. The soldiers in the task force fought gallantly but were not trained for rescues. Planning was limited to 24 hours from conception to execution. In contrast, the Philippine rescue was well-planned and even had air support. However, no air or artillery support for the Himmelberg raiders.

Patton did receive an oral reprimand from Eisenhower. If you would have been Patton’s commander in March 1945 what would you have done?

 

George Patton died in December 1945 from complications from an auto wreck. The controversy even surrounds this incident- was it an accident or an assassination?

Creighton Abrams stayed in the Army, was promoted to general, and eventually commanded all US forces in Vietnam in the last years of the war.

Abraham Baum left the Army after the war and died at the age of 91 in California.

John Waters was told by Patton that he did not know that Waters was in the camp. Waters survived, remained in the Army, and was eventually promoted to general. Until their deaths, Waters and Baum were friends.